The Meaning of “No Self”

“Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such Soul, Self, or Atman.”

Thus the notion of no self does occupy an important position among the teachings of Buddha. However, as stated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, the doctrine of anatman, no self , also creates stumbling block to our understanding. The bewildered Vacchagotta might be one of the persons who suffered the most from the notion of self and no self.

Furthermore, the Buddhist critique of the notion of ‘self’ is rooted in a specific historical context and initially directed towards particular understandings of the notion of self. As elucidated by the Anatta-lakkhana Sutra (SN 22.59; S iii 66; CDB i 901), the nature of self should be with the characteristics of (i) not leading to affliction, (ii) obeying the person of whom it is the Self (autonomy) and (iii) being permanent. They are totally contrasted to the Three Mark of Existence of Buddhism. However, these understandings of self are commonly shared by all religions which believed in eternalism/spiritualism (satssavada) such as Brahmanism and Jainism as well as some of the non-orthodox traditions mentioned in Samannaphala Sutra , which believed in annihilationism/materialism (uccedavada). Buddhists view both sassatavada and ucchedavada as two varieties of atmavada. It is because in the context of Buddhist teachings, any kind of thing, no matter it is material or mental, permanent or impermanent, could become a self (atman) if it turns into an object of self-identification. Thus the Buddhist doctrine of no self is the result of a critical response to these two views which seek to explain the nature of the human personality on the basis of a physical and metaphysical self.

In the Anatta-lakkhana Sutra, after having a series of analyses of the nature of five aggregates to prove them not being able to fulfill the criteria as a self, Buddha then recommended his disciples not to identify five aggregates as the self and attach to them. Instead of, they should develop their right discernment – ‘This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.’ Besides, although the Anatta-lakkhana Sutra is frequently cited to explain the nature of no self, we may present our doubt just like Mrs. Rys David in her allegation. She contested that Buddha did not deny the soul or self outright, but only pointed out that body, feeling, perception, mental fabrications and consciousness were not self. Based on this argument, it seems that the Anatta-lakkhana Sutra alone cannot adequately reflect the teachings of no self. We need to extend our understanding of no self by having more discussion on the doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratitya-samuptpada).

The doctrine of Dependent Origination refers to “This being, that exists; through the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that does not exist; through the ceasing of this, that ceases” which expresses the invariable concomitance between the arising and ceasing of any given phenomenon and the functional efficacy of its originative conditions. For example, the growth of plant is depending on the supportive conditions such as seed, soil, water, air, sunlight and so forth. And of course, the above supportive conditions also depend on their respective supportive conditions and so on. Similarly, the Buddha deconstructs the notion of self by introducing the analysis of five aggregates and their nature in the light of the doctrine of Dependent Origination: the five aggregates are working together in a flux of momentary change; they are never the same for two consecutive moments. Therefore, not only an autonomous, permanent and non-suffered self but also anything which claims to have intrinsic nature and to exist on its own are rejected. Thus the argument of Mrs. Rys David is null and void.

In addition, Mahayanists’ claim that Buddha only teaches Hinayanists the notion of emptiness of self (rén wú wǒ) in his early teaching; while the notion of emptiness of dharma (fa wú wǒ) has been unveiled not until the propagation of Mahayana sutras can also be refuted by the teaching of Dependent Origination on theoretical level. We can even say that Nagarjuna’s discourses on emptiness and the elimination of the intrinsic nature (svabhava) are only the further elaborations of the doctrine of Dependent Origination. By this point of view, theoretically, the meaning of no self thus can be understood in two different senses. Narrowly, it refers to the emptiness of the self of a human being. In a broad sense, it can also refer to the emptiness of any kind of intrinsic nature.
Nevertheless, on the other hand, it can be correct at the practical level because there will have different emphasis on the same teaching according to the different learners in different occasions. The Buddha identified that the five aggregates can be a source of suffering when they become objects of grasping even though they are not the suffering in their existence themselves. So, it can be said that this “ignorance,” the attachment to a false notion of self, is our deeply ingrained grasping mind that projects and apprehends intrinsic being or essence to our own selves and the various factors of existence. For Buddha, his ultimate concern is the liberation of mankind from suffering.

Therefore, after his enlightenment, he dedicated himself to convey the sole message in the rest of his life, as he told Anuradha, “Both formerly and now, it is only stress [dukkha] that I describe, and the cessation of stress [dukkha].” Just as what Pro. Y Karunadasa asserted:
Buddhism is concerned…with man’s existentialist predicament which according to Buddhism is the problem of suffering. If Buddhism is to be understood in this context, it follows that all Buddhist teachings – whether they relate to ontology, epistemology, psychology and ethics – are ultimately related to the problem of suffering and its final solution.

So does the teaching of no self.

 

Reference

1. Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980)
2. Majjhima Nikaya, 79.
3. Rahula,Walpola, What The Buddha Taught (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 1997).
4. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, No-self or Not-self? (Access to Insight edition, 1996.) (Source: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notself2.html)
5. Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).
6. Y. Karunadasa, “The Buddhist Critique of Sassatvada and Ucchedavada: The key to a proper Understanding of the Origin and the Doctrines of early Buddhism.” The Middle Way, U.K., vol 74 & 75, 1999-2000.

 

Sutra

1. Dhammapada 277 – 279, translated by Acharya Buddharakkhita. (Source: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/dhp/dhp.20.budd.html)
2. Digha Nikaya 2, Samaññaphala Sutta. (Source: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html)
3. Majjhima Nikaya, 79
4. Samyutta Nikaya, 22. (Source: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.086.than.html)
5. Samyutta Nikaya 22.59 (Source: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.059.than.html)
6. Samyutta Nikaya 44.10 (Source: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn44/sn44.010.than.html)