Introduction
Having reviewed the Abhidharmakośa-bhāsya-śāstra (AKB) and the Abhidharma-Nyāyānusāra-śāstra (Ny) on the controversies and the evolvement of the concept of co-existent cause, I would like to illustrate how Vasubandhu, a pro-Sautrāntika Abhidharmika drawn out the implicit meaning of simultaneous causality and redefined it as ‘reciprocally effects’ (互為果) in AKB. Vasubandhu used this new definition to challenge the Sarvāstivāda’s orthodoxy and its doctrinal claim on the nature of time and dharma-s. Meanwhile, on top of this, he established his reading of the idea ‘the tri-temporal states are real and equally exist’ as ‘the present exists, the past has been existed and the future will exist’ (現在是現有，過去是曾有及未來是當有). Concerning this new interpretation of ‘all exists’ (sarvāstitva), although it is literally different from the Vibhajyavādins’ fundamental understanding of temporality – ‘the present alone exist, the past and future are not exist’ – this undoubtedly is very similar to the standpoint of Vibhajyavādins or Sautrāntika.
Facing Vasubandhu’s challenge, interestingly, Saṃghabhadra, the author of Ny and the follower of orthodox Sarvāstivāda well accepted the new definition and he even defended it by making quotations of sutra-s. Nevertheless, he criticized that Vasubandhu should not only understand co-existent cause in such a narrow sense. From his point of view, co-existent cause should also be understood as ‘sharing the same effect’ (同取一果). His allegations fully reflected the definition of ‘reciprocally effects’ could align with the orthodox understanding of the nature of time and dharma-s. That was the reason why Saṃghabhadra tried to reconcile the disputes: On one hand, he defended the validity of Vasubandhu’s reading of co-existent cause as ‘reciprocally effect’. On the other hand, he tried his best to maintain ‘sharing the same effect’ as the orthodox reading of Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāsā-śāstra (MVŚ) which should be emphasized too. Moreover, Saṃghabhadra also had his unique contributions by introducing the concept of ‘co-nascent’ as an essential element of co-existent cause and interpreting ‘non-existence’ as the state of a dharma without kārita, that he presented clearly the integrated ideas of ‘sharing the same effect’ and ‘reciprocally effect’.
In this essay, my discussion will be primarily based on Ven. Yin Shun’s research on Sarvāstivāda. On the other hand, the discussion on the controversies will be largely based on the discussion of co-existent cause as contributed by Venerable Dhammajoti. In addition, all the English translations in this essay are basically quoted from Ven. Dhammajoti’s article “The Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality” as published in Journal of Buddhist Studies. Moreover, the Chinese citations as inscribed in footnote are abstracted from the Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection 2007 of the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA) as a cross reference.
The asymmetrical relationship of co-existent cause
Around 4 to 5 century AD, Sarvāstivāda reached its another prosperous age because of Vasubandhu’s great work on AKB. This book integrated most of the prominent and precise teachings of Sarvāstivāda and some of other Theravāda schools.
Vasubandhu directly defined co-existent cause as ‘reciprocally effects’ in AKB. He simply referred that this definition was come from MVŚ:
“The commentary [MVŚ] said: If dharma-s are reciprocally virile effects, then the dharma-s are co-existent causes…In this way the whole of the conditioned, accordingly as it is applicable are co-existent causes.”
Moreover, he noted that the asymmetrical relationship between dharma-s and their secondary characteristics to be more exact as the below description:
“It is to be added that without being effect to each other, a dharma is the co-existent cause of its secondary characteristics (anulaksana); not vice versa”.
According to Foguang Buddhist Dictionary, all conditioned dharma-s are confirmed with respect to arising (jāti), duration (sthiti), decay (anyathātva) and impermanence (anityatā), which are the four primary characteristics (本相). However, as these four primary characteristics are also conditioned dharma-s, they can only arise with conditions. Therefore, they also have four secondary characteristics (隨相), namely, arising-arising, duration-duration, decay-decay and impermanence-impermanence. Therefore, when there is a rise of a dharma, the above-mentioned eight characteristics and the dharma itself arise and work together mutually. However, the four secondary characteristics can only have efficacy on their own primary characteristic, i.e. the secondary characteristic ‘arising-arising’ can only have efficacy on the primary characteristics ‘arising’ but not for others. Thus, Vasubandhu pointed out that there are two kinds of co-existence:
“Those take co-existent causes as causes must be co-existence, or some co-existence take non co-existent causes as causes. Just like the secondary characteristic and their dharma-s … also the secondary characteristics of the dharma-s which are the thought-accompaniments and thought …all these dharma-s, although called as co-existent, they are not formed by co-existent causes.”
Defining co-existent cause as ‘reciprocally effect’
Based on the above discussion, Vasubandhu then introduced two kinds of causalities: one is sequential causality and the other is simultaneous causality:
“Those who good at logic (hetu-vidyā) would say [there is a] causal relationship in as much as the one exists or does not exist, the other likewise exists or does not exist, we can say that this one is the cause and the other one is effect. [While] co-existent dharma-s means one exists all exist or one does not exist all do not exist – this is also a [valid] causal relationship.”
Vasubandhu used flame and light, sprout and shadow as examples to illustrate the idea of simultaneous causality. He explained:
“Take flame and light as causes, they co-arise with those previous causes and conditions. Shadow appears when light is blocked. [But] how can we say that the sprout is the cause of the shadow? This does not make sense because [it should be understood as] in the sense of exist or does not exist.”
Therefore, from Vasubandhu’s point of view, co-existence should be understood in the sense of existence or non-existence. Taking sprout and shadow as examples again: if there is no sprout (sprout does not exist), there will be no shadow (shadow does not exist); and vice-versa. We cannot say either one is the cause of the existence of the other. Likewise, this is also true for thought and thought-concomitants: we cannot find thought without the existence of thought-concomitants and thought-concomitants without the existence of thought. Therefore, we cannot say thought is the cause of thought-concomitants and vice-versa. In this sense, Vasubandhu reinterpreted co-existent cause as reciprocally effect.
In sum, the above discussion reflected that Vasubandhu firstly drew reference to MVŚ to validate ‘co-existent cause’ could be understood as ‘reciprocally effect’. Secondly, he then pointed out the asymmetrical relationship between dharma-s and their secondary characteristics, which resulted in having two kinds of co-existence: one is formed by co-existent cause (i.e. thought and thought-concomitants) and the other is by non co-existent cause (i.e. dharma-s and its secondary characteristics). Thirdly, he well distinguished two kinds of causality such as sequential and simultaneous causalities and focused on discussing the second one by having flame and light, and sprout and shadow as examples. At last, he successfully drew out the implicit meaning of ‘co-existent cause’ and re-defined as ‘reciprocally effects’. His step-by-step inference was totally within the theoretical framework of MVŚ and the Sarvāstivāda’s doctrinal thesis. This is the reason why Saṃghabhadra well accepted this new definition.
Vasubandhu did give a significant contribution to this area especially his wonderful works on defining co-existent cause in terms of ‘exist’ or ‘do not exist’ rather than in the terms of a subject-object causal relationship or a sequential order. Thus it could avoid having a nonsensical and ridiculous understanding of taking sprout (subject) as the cause of the shadow (object) and vice-versa. In other words, ‘reciprocally effect’ denoted a causal relationship which could be expressed as ‘co-existent dharma-s means one exists, all exist; or one does not exist, all do not exist.’ This could be well understood by the co-existent causal relationship of thought and thought-concomitants. I would say, a Sautrantika master, Sthavira Śrīlāta’s argument of ‘the two horns of an ox’ was also derived from this interpretation. By having ‘reciprocally effect’ as the definition of co-existent cause, Vasubandhu set off his criticism.
Vasubandhu’s criticism of co-existent cause
Thus, by introducing the new definition with reference to the theoretical framework of Sarvāstivāda, Vasubandhu moved one step further – he critically reviewed the concept of ‘reciprocally effects’ and totally rejected its validity by claiming that this innate concept was not supported by sūtra-s.
“Vaibhāṣika said: ‘Contact and sensation are co-arising because [they are] mutually co-existent causes. Why the meaning of this two co-arising dharma-s as a producer and produced can be established? Why it can not established? It is because they have no efficacy (功能)…Our school concedes this two [contact and sensation] are co-existence causes and also reciprocally effect. Although it is allowed [by our school], however, sūtra does not allow these two having a mutually cause-effect relationship. Sūtra only concedes that having eye contact as condition which gives rise to sensation. There is no sūtra concedes that having eye sensation as condition which gives rise to contact. It is not a right understanding because it has already exceeded the rule of production (能生法).”
If the concept of co-existent cause (when it is reading as ‘reciprocally effect’) was refuted, the doctrinal claim of Sarvāstivāda on ‘all exist’ (sarvāstitva) thereby would be refuted. His arguments such as ‘have no efficacy’, ‘non-discrimination of cause and effect’ and ‘exceeded the rule of production’ were very similar to those of Sautrāntika which would be elaborated in the subsequent discussion.
Saṃghabhadra’s response and defense
In responding to Vasubandhu’s challenge, Saṃghabhadra, a proponent of orthodox Sarvāstivāda accepted the definition of ‘reciprocally effect’ but he found it was not the sole explanation. From his point of view, it should also be understood as ‘sharing the same effect’, the orthodox reading of MVŚ. Therefore, he disagreed that Vasubandhu should not only understand co-existent cause in such a narrow sense:
“Herein, the scope of the characteristics of the cause [as described by Vasubandhu] is too narrow – the thought-accompaniments and the characteristics [of the conditioned] should in each case be mentioned as co-existent causes among themselves. Thus he should not have said that only those which are reciprocally effect of one another are co-existent cause. A dharma and its secondary characteristics are not reciprocally effect, yet it is a [co-existent] cause of the latter [though the latter are not its co-existent cause] … Therefore, the characteristics [of this cause] should be explained thus: Those conditioned dharma-s which share the same effect can [also] be considered as co-existent causes; there is no fault [in explaining thus], as it is so explained in the mūla- śāstra…”
Just like Vasubandhu, Saṃghabhadra also backed his argument up by drawing scriptural authority from sūtra. He went a step further to defend that ‘reciprocally effects’ could also be regarded as a legitimate reading of co-existent causes. He asserted that the doctrine of Conditioned Co-arising had already indicated the existence of co-existent causes:
“Thus now [we] should explain: What is the meaning of the co-arising dharma-s has causal relations when they come together. Now [let’s] explain the characteristics of causality so as to help you understand there exists co-existent causes … Let’s quote the Buddha’s succinct statement of the principle of Conditioned Co-arising as an example: ‘This being, that exists. From the arising of this, that arises’. Contrary to this are non-existence, non-arising. This is the general characteristics of causality.”
Based on the Buddha’s teaching, Saṃghabhadra claimed that there were two types of causes: those which precede their effects (前生因) which is represented by the statement ‘from the arising of this, that arises’; and those which are co-nascent with their effects (俱生因) which is represented by the statement ‘this being, that exists’. However, Sthavira Śrīlāta, disagreed to this interpretation.
Nevertheless, Saṃghabhadra added a new dimension to the argument of co-existent cause by introducing the concept of ‘co-nascent’. According to Ven. Dhammajoti, Saṃghabhadra’s lengthy arguments purporting to establish the co-nascent cause was in fact primarily aimed at establishing the co-existent cause. Therefore, to understand the co-existent cause in the times of Saṃghabhadra, it was important for us to understand the actual meaning of the co-nascent cause at the same time. The Sautrantika criticism of the co-existent cause and Saṃghabhadra’s response in Ny could help us acquire a better understanding of the meaning of both the co-nascent and the co-nascent cause.
The fallacies of co-existent cause: challenges from Sautrāntika
According to Sautrāntika, if co-existent cause exists, logically, it will lead to the fallacies of ‘given rise of effect without cause’, ‘dharma-s arise perpetually’ and ‘non-discrimination of cause and effect’. The argument over the fallacy of ‘given rise of effect without cause’ can be refuted by Saṃghabhadra’s following explanation:
“… And for the future dharma-s are allowed to take as causes. They exist in their essential nature(體) although devoid of the specific type of causal function, namely kārita(作用). If you do not allow future [dharma-s] can be taken as causes, you should accept they are absolute non-existents like a hare’s horn … There are many understanding of non-existence (無). When we say both future and past are non-existent, we are talking about their non-existence of kārita but not their essential nature. Because of the existence of the essential nature of future, [we] can have the producer and the produced. At the time when they are arising and are about enter the present time period, though without kārita, they can have the causal efficacy (功能) of giving rise to other dharma-s.”
Saṃghabhadra refuted this criticism of this fallacy by defining ‘non-existence’ as the non-existence of kārita instead of an absolute non-existence. Both past and future dharma-s always exist according to the fundamental thesis of Sarvāstivāda and thus they can have the causal efficacy of giving rise to other dharma-s when they are arising and are about enter the present time period. Saṃghabhadra continued his argument as follows:
“And the Sarvāstivāda does not consider that causes, whether already arisen or not arisen, are real agents because dharma-s do not have ‘real activity’ (kārita). Real activity refers to causes and conditions that can always produce effects. This so-called real activity is not the teaching of the Buddha. For the arising of dharma-s, they are mutually non-separated and mutually dependent. If one is missing, then the remaining dharma-s also can not arise … This causal efficacy not always exists, therefore the fallacy of ‘dharma-s arise perpetually’ can not established. In addition, I do not claim that the arising of dharma-s is solely relay on co-nascent causes but not rely on other causes. Therefore, the fallacy of ‘dharma-s arise perpetually’ can not established.”
When responding to the third criticism, Saṃghabhadra pointed out that Sthavira Śrīlāta’s example of the two horns of an ox is a case of false analogy:
“As [we all] understand when one horn is broken, the other is not thereby broken. If one is broken and the other is thereby broken, then it can be a [valid] illustration as the co-arising of thought and thought-concomitants. Moreover, I do not concede that all co-nascent [dharma-s] are mutual/reciprocally cause-effect relationship. What I conceded only those which share the same effect; or those which are reciprocally effects; or where by the force of this, that dharma can arise. The example of the two horns of an ox is not the case. Thus it is a case of false analogy.”
Therefore, from Saṃghabhadra’s point of view, the term ‘co-nascent’ does not merely mean two or more dharma-s exist at the same time but they should present some kinds of causal relationship, i.e. co-existent causation. Moreover, he interpreted ‘non-existence’ is a state of a dharma without kārita while their intrinsic nature and efficacy for giving arising to dharma are always existed.
Conclusion
The literature review informed that Vasubandhu extracted ‘reciprocally effect’ as an implicit meaning of co-existent cause to challenge the Sarvāstivāda’s orthodoxy and its doctrinal claim on the nature of time and dharma-s. However, Saṃghabhadra on one hand validated Vasubandhu’s reading of co-existent cause as ‘reciprocally effect’; but on the other hand, he tried his best to keep ‘sharing the same effect’ as the orthodox reading of MVŚ as stated in his book, Ny. By introducing the concept of ‘co-nascent’ and the idea of non-existence is the state of a dharma without kārita, I would say, he well presented the integrated ideas of ‘sharing the same effect’ and ‘reciprocally effect’ in a clear picture within the framework of Sarvāstivāda’s doctrinal claims on the nature of tri-temporality and dharma-s.
Regarding to the above controversies on the interpretations and descriptions of simultaneous causality, Ven. Dhammajoti rendered his substantial conclusion. He said we may broadly classify these definitions or descriptions of the essential characteristics of sahabhū-hetu/saṃprayuktaka-hetu into the three key areas. Firstly, the very existence of one is necessarily dependent on the other based on the sense that the co-nascent dharma-s are reciprocally causes, reciprocally effects, mutually induced, arisen through mutual strength, necessarily co-nascent, etc. Secondly, in the sense that the co-nascent dharma-s are mutually dependent and suitably coordinated and strengthened, it gives rise to a common effect, or accomplish a common causal event simultaneous to them. Thirdly, in the sense-at least-that between the two co-nascent dharma-s, one is arisen through the strength of the other.
Finally, in a series of debates as quoted in the above, I consider that one of the most important contributions is all of them succeeded in cultivating fine development of Yogācāra’s fundamental theories. As pointed out by Venerable Dhammajoti, Yogācāra not only accepts the Sarvāstivāda position as regards on causation, but is more explicit in stating that there is no other real causality outside that represented by the sahabhū and sahabhū-hetu.
Reference
- Bhikkhu Dhammajoti, “The Sarvāstivāda Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality”, Journal of Buddhist Studies, Vol I, May 2003.
- Bhikkhu Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Adhidharma. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007.
- Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection 2007. Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association. http://www.cbeta.org/index.htm.
- Foguang Buddhist Dictionary. 2003.
- 印順，(1968)《說一切有部為主的論書與論師之研究》，台灣：正聞出版社。http:// www.yinshun.org.tw.